The Tragedy of Alaska Airlines Flight 261

On January 31, 2000, Alaska Airlines Flight 261 crashed into the Pacific Ocean about 11 miles from the coast of Ventura County, California killing all 88 persons aboard (83 passengers and five crew members).  The 2 pilots, 3 cabin crew members, and 83 passengers on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces.

Alaska Airlines expanded rapidly in the years before this accident. With the goal of becoming more profitable, as they became bigger and busier the pressures to keep their planes on schedule put increasing stress on their maintenance facilities. And this took its toll.

The Federal Aviation Administration seemed to know this, but was nowhere effective in preventing the tragic chain of events.

So N963AS began its fateful path in a C-check years before falling into the ocean. Its maintainers found a jackscrew that needed to be pulled, but no spare was found and, as the part was arguably acceptable, they pushed the plane back into service, with no watch list, no trailers, or orders to keep track of its condition. There were no specific procedures to do so, and no one thought enough to ask for one. The aircraft was arguably, that is technically, legal, and it was probably safe, if it was carefully greased. It was not, we know that without question.

And the lengthened inspection intervals were such that it was not to be looked at again, until it was in our laboratory.

When it finally failed, ground support from Alaska Airlines seemed to encourage the crew to proceed with a broken plane on to their scheduled destination, for reasons perhaps of convenience both to passengers and maintenance -- we won't really ever know. But the impression is inescapable. An aircraft that had been hustled out the door three years earlier for the convenience of scheduling was now encouraged to keep to its appointed routing. It is less coincidence than culture.

http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0201.pdf

Close Air Support article from airforcemag

Some 400 yards up the mountain, an enemy fighter had the men locked in his machine gun’s firing zone. "They really don’t have anywhere to go and there’s no real ability to shoot back up at the mountains [because] they don’t really know where these attacks are coming from," said Johnson of the pinned-down forces on the ground. "All they know is that they can’t get out of that situation."

Metzger panned the Sniper pod’s infrared eye along the slope, following prompts from Bowers below. Peering at the screen, Metzger and Capt. Craig J. Steffek—Bone 21’s defensive weapons system officer—suddenly spotted the telltale glimmer of muzzle flashes, then a puff of smoke from a mortar. This was the first time the airmen spotted projectiles coming off the mountainside and the ridgeline into the friendly positions, said Metzger.

The WSOs determined the location’s coordinates and sent live imagery to Bowers. Following on his remotely operated video enhanced receiver, Bowers confirmed the ridgeline and the target.

Steffek selected a tight grouping, mixing 500-pound GBU-38s with larger 2,000-pound GBU-31s. Banking to the right to keep the Sniper pod on target, the WSOs confirmed detonation.

The effect was immediate. Pulling away from the target "everything had stopped, which is usually a good indication," said Capt. Andrew F. Long, mission copilot. With the bomb detonations echoing in the background, Steffek could hear the troops near Bowers’ radio cheering the blasts. "That’s a unique feeling—a reassurance for us the aircrew," he said.
---
In the future, if a JDAM or SDB would be overkill, there will be smaller laser-guided missiles available.

http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/April%202012/0412lancer.aspx
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Attack_Guided_Rocket
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Precision_Kill_Weapon_System